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Abstract—Network operators can and do deploy multiple
routing control-planes, e.g., by running different protocols or
instances of the same protocol. With the rise of SDN, multiple
control-planes are likely to become even more popular, e.g., to
enable hybrid SDN or multi-controller deployments. Unfortu-
nately, previous works do not apply to arbitrary combinations
of centralized and distributed control-planes.
In this paper, we develop a general theory for coexisting
control-planes. We provide a novel, exhaustive classification of
existing and future control-planes (e.g., OSPF, EIGRP, and Open-
Flow) based on fundamental control-plane properties that we
identify. Our properties are general enough to study centralized
and distributed control-planes under a common framework.
We show that multiple uncoordinated control-planes can cause
forwarding anomalies whose type solely depends on the identified
properties. To show the wide applicability of our framework, we
leverage our theoretical insight to (i) provide sufficient conditions
to avoid anomalies, (ii) propose configuration guidelines, and
(iii) define a provably-safe procedure for reconfigurations from
any (combination of) control-planes to any other. Finally, we dis-
cuss prominent consequences of our findings on the deployment
of new paradigms (notably, SDN) and previous research works.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intradomain routing is key to network operation. Luck-
ily, operators have several degrees of control on it. They
can choose from a variety of routing protocols, including
static routing, several Interior Gateway Protocols (IGPs) (e.g.,
EIGRP, OSPF, or IS-IS), and Software Defined Networking
(SDN) ones (e.g., OpenFlow [1]). Each protocol provides
configuration knobs (e.g., IGP link weights) to influence route
dissemination and forwarding path computation. Also, routers
can build multiple control-planes, by simultaneously running
multiple protocols (or multiple instances of the same protocol,
as in OSPF), each with its own configuration, in logically-
separated software processes. We say that control-planes are
coexisting if they run independently from each other without
exchanging information (e.g., without route redistribution [2]).
As emerged from discussions with Internet Service Provider
operators, coexisting control-planes are used in real-world
networks for a number of practical use cases. First, multiple
control-planes can improve network robustness. For example,
they help mitigate the risk of bugs in specific implementations
of a given routing protocol by confining them to a single
control-plane. Also, if a problem occurs in one control-plane,
connectivity can be preserved by shifting traffic to forwarding
paths managed by another control-plane. Second, coexisting
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control-planes can be used for traffic engineering, e.g., assign-
ing distinct classes of traffic to different control-planes. For
example, latency-sensitive traffic can be assigned to an IGP
control-plane supporting specific traffic engineering features,
while best-effort traffic can be handled by a separate control-
plane with a less resource-demanding IGP. Third, coexisting
control-planes can help accommodate network dynamics, e.g.,
failures or traffic shifts. For instance, they can improve fast
failure recovery [3], and facilitate disruption-free reconfigura-
tions, to arbitrarily change (e.g., for traffic engineering) the
configuration of a given protocol (e.g., a link-state IGP [4]) or
to migrate from one protocol to another (e.g., [5], [6]).
We expect coexisting control-planes to become even more
popular with the growing interest in SDN. First, hybrid SDN
networks, running both SDN and traditional routing protocols
and enabled by hybrid routers [1], can (i) improve routing
flexibility with respect to pure IGP networks [7], (ii) enable
deployment of advanced network capabilities (like network
function virtualization) [8], (iii) combine the flexibility of SDN
with the scalability and robustness of IGPs [9], and (iv) enable
a smooth migration to a pure SDN deployment [10]. Second,
coexisting SDN control-planes capture the case of multiple
uncoordinated controllers managing the same devices.
Control-plane coexistence does not create routing anoma-
lies, because no information is exchanged between control-
planes. Still, even if each control-plane is correct in the
absence of others, inconsistent forwarding entries installed on
routers may result in data-plane disruptions.
In this paper, we develop the first theoretical framework to
reason about the coexistence of arbitrary control-planes. Our
contribution is manifold.
First, in Sec. II, we propose a model for hybrid routers
that is general enough to capture heterogeneous control-planes,
independent of the adopted path computation algorithms and
of the header fields used to match and forward packets.
Second, in Sec. III, we characterize coexisting control-
planes prone to forwarding anomalies. We classify control-
planes according to two fundamental properties, based on
the input data structure (RIB or FIB) from which routes are
fetched before being disseminated, and the output data struc-
ture (RIB or FIB) where routes are installed. Our classification
is (i) exhaustive, i.e., it covers existing protocols and future
ones applying to the current router design; and (ii) novel,
as it is orthogonal to traditional classifications like link-state
vs. distance-vector protocols. We prove, in Sec. IV, that the
kinds of anomalies resulting from control-plane coexistence
depend solely on our classification. For the combinations of
control-planes that are not inherently anomaly-free, we provide
sufficient conditions that guarantee correctness.
Third, in Sec. V, we exemplify the wide applicability of our
theoretical framework by leveraging it to (i) propose configura-
tion guidelines that prevent anomalies for coexisting control-
planes; and (ii) devise a procedure for safe reconfigurations
from any combination of control-planes to any other.
Fourth, in Sec. VI, we discuss the implications of our results
from the point of view of network operators and protocol
designers. Further, we analyze the impact of our findings on
the deployment of new protocols and paradigms, focusing on
SDN. Notably, our theory exposes behavioral differences of
distinct SDN proposals, e.g., showing that a straightforward
implementation of OpenFlow is not inherently safe when
coexisting with traditional routing protocols. In comparison,
competing SDN proposals (e.g., I2RS [11]) provide more
correctness guarantees. Our findings also enable us to evaluate
risks and consequences of design choices in hybrid SDN
networks, like the simultaneous usage of routes provided by
OpenFlow and IGP for multi-path routing.
Fifth, in Sec. VII, we discuss related work. Our results gen-
eralize and extend previous contributions on safe coexistence
of multiple IGP instances (e.g., [12]), hybrid SDN networks
(e.g., [7]) and safe reconfigurations (e.g., [4]).
Finally, we conclude in Sec. VIII.
II. MODEL
In this section, we present our router model and notation.
We first describe our model (Sec. II-A), then we formalize
the notion of correctness (Sec. II-B), and lastly we discuss the
generality of our formalization (Sec. II-C).
A. Routers, Protocols, and Control-Planes
In a network, data packets produced by end hosts are relayed
hop-by-hop by intermediate nodes that we call routers. Our
router model is illustrated in Fig. 1. We defer the discussion
of inputs and outputs to Sec. III.
Each router maintains a table called Forwarding Information
Base (FIB). For any router r and any destination d, a FIB
entry fib(r, d) contains the next-hop of r to d. For any
destination d to be reachable, at least one router r must be
directly connected to d. We refer to the software processes
that populate routers’ FIB, e.g., by running routing protocols
in a given configuration, as control-planes. Each control-
plane stores its own routing information in a separate Routing
Information Base (RIB). We write ribM (r, d) to indicate the
route (i.e., a path on the network) in the RIB of a router r for
control-plane M and destination d. If a control-plane M does
not provide r with any route for d, then ribM (r, d) = ∅.
Routers can run multiple control-planes at the same time.
To choose which control-plane writes to the FIB, routers rely
on a local control-plane selection process. This process is
based on the preference locally assigned to each control-plane.
For example, the preference of IGP control-planes is based
on the value of the so-called Administrative Distance (AD)
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Fig. 1. Router model.
assigned to the corresponding IGPs. Preferences (e.g., AD
values) can be typically set by router configuration, on a per-
destination basis. Finally, routers select the next-hop from the
most preferred control-plane providing a non-empty RIB entry,
and copy it to the FIB. We say that a given control-plane M
is used by a router r for a destination d if M is the control-
plane that populates the FIB with an entry fib(r, d) 6= ∅.
We denote the used control-plane as used(r, d). By definition,
M = used(r, d) implies that fib(r, d) is the next-hop of r
in ribM (r, d) and ribM (r, d) 6= ∅. For directly connected
destinations, the control-plane selection process is skipped,
and we say that all control-planes are used at the same time.
B. Forwarding Correctness
In this paper, we are interested in studying the impact of
control-plane coexistence on routing and forwarding correct-
ness. In the absence of information exchange between control-
planes (e.g., route redistribution), routing is guaranteed to be
stable [12]. Hence, we focus on forwarding correctness.
We say that a network is forwarding correct (or simply
correct) if for every router r and destination d, the forwarding
path from r to d terminates in d. A forwarding path is
the concatenation of FIB entries for the same destination.
More precisely, a forwarding path pi(r, d) from router r to
destination d is a sequence of routers (v0 . . . vk) such that
k ≥ 0, v0 = r, and ∀i = 0, . . . , k − 1, vi+1 = fib(vi, d).
In the case of incorrectness, we distinguish between two
forwarding anomalies: blackholes and forwarding loops. A
blackhole at router r for destination d occurs if pi(r, d) =
(r v0 . . . vk), with k ≥ 0, vk 6= d and fib(vk, d) = ∅. A
forwarding loop occurs if pi(r, d) contains repeated nodes. A
forwarding loop directly leads to packet losses since packets
are forwarded indefinitely along the loop and eventually dis-
carded. Conversely, when a blackhole exists for a destination
d, packets destined to d will be either dropped or forwarded
based on a less specific destination (e.g., a default route). In
the latter case, packets to the same destination are routed in-
consistently among different routers, possibly leading to hard-
to-debug forwarding inconsistencies and service disruption.
To focus on forwarding anomalies caused by control-plane
coexistence, we assume correctness in isolation, i.e., each
control-plane is assumed to be stable and forwarding correct
in the absence of other control-planes. Routing stability is
needed to even define the forwarding state. Moreover, for every
control-plane M , we assume that (i) no blackhole occurs if M
is the only deployed control-plane, and (ii) irrespective of the
presence of other control-planes, the RIB entries provided by
M to all routers for any given destination never form a loop,
which prevents forwarding loops. Distributed routing protocols
are correct in isolation by design. For centralized (e.g., SDN)
control-planes, we assume correctness to be ensured by the
implementation of the controller.
C. Generality of the Model
So far, we have not yet specified what a destination is.
We define a destination more generally as any combination
of fields in an IP packet that can be used by a router to select
a route. A few examples follow. Any IPv4 or IPv6 prefix is a
destination, as routers support destination-based forwarding.
Moreover, if per-flow Equal Cost Multi Path (ECMP) is
configured, then any source and destination IP pair can be
a distinct destination. Similarly, if routing is based on sources
and DSCP codepoints, a destination is a combination of DSCP
codepoint, source and destination IP prefix.
Control-plane coexistence intrinsically poses two con-
straints: (i) A router must be either directly connected to a
destination in all control-planes, or not directly connected to
that destination in any control-plane; and (ii) the hierarchy
of destinations (e.g., the deaggregation of destination IP pre-
fixes) must be consistent across all control-planes. The first
constraint is needed to let all control-planes share the same
view of the physical topology. The second constraint is needed
for control-plane preference to be well-defined, as comparison
between control-planes is defined per-destination, Note, how-
ever, that this constraint can always be enforced by creating
a mapping between destinations used in different control-
planes. For example, if an OSPF and an OpenFlow control-
planes respectively match destination and source IP prefixes,
destination consistency can be enforced if OpenFlow matches
both source and OSPF-matched destination IP prefixes (instead
of sources only).
III. CONTROL-PLANE TAXONOMY
We now present our novel control-plane taxonomy. It
is based on fundamental control-plane properties presented
in Sec. III-A. Those properties are orthogonal, hence any
combination of them maps to a different class of control-
planes in our taxonomy. We show how our taxonomy applies to
control-planes running existing routing protocols in Sec. III-B.
A. Fundamental Properties of Routing Control-Planes
The properties that characterize our taxonomy relate to
control-plane input and output data structures.
Input (Route Dissemination). We distinguish between FIB-
UNAWARE (FU) and FIB-AWARE (FA) control-planes. If the
FIB is used as an input to route dissemination, we say that
the control-plane is FA, otherwise it is FU.
Namely, FU control-planes disseminate the same routes
independently of FIB entries, e.g., solely on the basis of the
content of the RIB (asMk in Fig. 1). Consider for example the
network topology depicted in Fig. 2, where r1, r2 and r3 are
Fig. 2. A simple network to illustrate the difference between FU and FA.
routers, all participating to an FU control-plane M , and d is a
destination directly connected to r1. All routers participate to
an FU control-planeM , and ribM (r3, d) = (r3 r2 r1 d). Even
if r2’s FIB entry for d is provided by another control-plane
(e.g., a static route), this does not affect ribM (r3, d). That is,
the following property holds by definition of FU control-plane.
Property 1: Let M be an FU control-plane. For any router
r and destination d, ribM (r, d) does not depend on any other
coexisting control-plane M ′ 6= M .
Conversely, FA control-planes react to FIB changes by
distributing updated routes (as M2 in Fig. 1). In Fig. 2, if
the configured control-plane M is FA, then changes to r2’s
FIB entry for d cause M to update the RIB entry for d at
r3. For example, if a route from another control-plane (e.g., a
static route) is installed in r2’s FIB, then r2 stops propagating
to r3 the route given by M . More generally, in an FA control-
plane, a router propagates a route to a destination d only if that
route is used to compute its FIB entry to d. More formally,
the following property holds.
Property 2: Let M be an FA control-plane. For any router r
and destination d, ribM (r, d) = (r i . . . d)⇒M = used(i, d).
Output (Route Installation) We distinguish between NON-
PREEMPTIVE and PREEMPTIVE control-planes, depending
on whether they output routes directly to the FIB or to
the RIB. Traditional control-planes, e.g., running IGPs, are
non-preemptive, since they use the routers’ RIBs to store
their respective best routes (as M2 and Mk in Fig. 1). On
the contrary, SDN control-planes, e.g., running OpenFlow,
typically move routing information out of routers. Routes
are indeed computed and stored in a logically-centralized
controller, which push them directly to router FIBs (as M1
in Fig. 1). Hence, OpenFlow control-planes are preemptive.
Despite the fact that preemptive control-planes bypass the
control-plane selection process, they still allow network opera-
tors to configure per-destination control-plane preference. For
example, OpenFlow switches can use the so-called “normal
port” to defer the forwarding decision to other control-planes
(see Section 5.1 of [1]). However, since the control-plane
selection process is bypassed, it is not possible for a non-
preemptive control-plane to defer the forwarding decision to a
preemptive one. We model this asymmetry by imposing that,
for any router r, a preemptive control-plane either (i) is the
most preferred one and used by r, or (ii) does not provide any
route. More formally, the following property holds.
Property 3: Let M be preemptive control-plane. For any
router r and destination d, ribM (r, d) 6= ∅ if and only if M
is the most preferred control-plane by r.
If several preemptive control-planes are present (e.g., two
uncoordinated SDN controllers), the most preferred control-
control-plane Properties
OpenFlow, ForCES preemptive, FU
Static routes, RCP, I2RS non-preemptive, FU
OSPF, ISIS, BGP-as-IGP non-preemptive, FU
RIP, EIGRP non-preemptive, FA
TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION OF CONTROL-PLANES RUNNING EXISTING PROTOCOLS.
plane by any router r is the last one that wrote to r’s FIB.
B. Mapping Properties to Routing Control-Planes
Our taxonomy is general enough to capture a wide variety
of control-planes, and expose their differences. Table I reports
the classification, according to commercial (Cisco and Juniper)
implementations, of the currently most popular control-planes.
Different IGP-based control-planes belong to distinct
classes. While all are non-preemptive, OSPF and ISIS build
FU control-planes, while RIP and EIGRP lead to FA ones.
Furthermore, BGP when used for intradomain routing1 [13]
behaves as an FU control-plane.
We experimentally verified those claims by simulating the
network depicted in Fig. 2 with Cisco routers. In particular,
for each routing protocol, we set up a distinct experiment.
In each experiment, we configured r1, r2 and r3 to talk a
given protocol, and we continuously probed d from r3. After
checking the correctness of the basic setup, we added a static
route for d on r2, such that the static route was preferred over
the IGP one. With RIP and EIGRP, the probes started failing.
In fact, the static route caused the r2’s FIB to be updated
and r2 to send a route withdrawal to r3, consistently with
Property 2. Conversely, in OSPF, ISIS and BGP, the static
route did not impact the ability of r3 to reach d.
Similarly, SDN control-planes like those built on RCP [14],
I2RS [11], ForCES [15] and OpenFlow [16] also fall in distinct
classes. All of them are FU, at least in their basic configuration
in which the SDN controller takes its routing decisions inde-
pendently of the content of routers’ FIBs. However, only RCP
and I2RS are non-preemptive, since ForCES and OpenFlow
control-planes write to the routers’ FIBs.
Note that our taxonomy is orthogonal to traditional classifi-
cations, e.g., between distance-vector and link-state protocols.
For instance, EIGRP and BGP are both distance-vector proto-
cols, yet they are in distinct classes.
Even more interestingly, our taxonomy is also exhaustive.
Indeed, as long as routers can be represented by our model
(e.g., see Fig. 1), a control-plane must be either FU or FA
(i.e., reacting to FIB changes or not), and either preemptive
or non-preemptive (i.e., writing to the FIB or to the RIB).
Abstracting away all internal details and restricting to the
analysis of their input/output properties allows us to model
future control-planes. For instance, we can model any FU
version of distance-vector IGPs, as well as FA variants of
OpenFlow. We leverage this generality to evaluate different
proposals for SDN protocol implementation in Sec. VI.
1since we focus on intradomain routing, we do not consider the usage of
BGP for interdomain routing
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Fig. 3. Abstract examples showing that (a) blackholes can occur if only
preemptive and FA control-planes coexist, and (b) forwarding loops can occur
in the presence of multiple FU control-planes. Circles represent routers, while
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IV. CHARACTERIZATION OF FORWARDING ANOMALIES
WITH COEXISTING CONTROL-PLANES
In this section, we show that the properties identified in
Sec. III determine correctness guarantees of arbitrary coexist-
ing control-planes (Sec. IV-A). We also provide sufficient con-
ditions to avoid forwarding anomalies in potentially trouble-
some combinations of coexisting control-planes (Sec. IV-B).
A. Taxonomy-Based Characterization
We start by dealing with blackholes, i.e., identifying all the
combinations of control-planes in which blackholes can occur.
The following theorem holds.
Theorem 1: Coexisting control-planes are guaranteed to be
free of blackholes if and only if they i) include non-preemptive
FU control-planes, or ii) do not include both a preemptive
control-plane M and an FA control-plane M ′ 6= M .
Proof: We prove the statement in two steps.
If coexisting control-planes do not comply with Conditions i)
and ii), then blackholes can occur. Consider the example
in Fig. 3(a), in which circles represent routers and d is a
destination attached to y. An FA control-plane is the most
preferred one by x, while all neighbors v1, . . . , vN of x prefer
and use a preemptive control-plane. Consider the RIB entries
of x towards d. To not violate Property 2, ribM (x, d) = ∅ for
all FA control-planes M running on x. Also, by Property 3,
ribM¯ (x, d) = ∅ for all preemptive control-planes M¯ running
on x. By hypothesis, there are no non-preemptive FU control-
planes. Hence, x cannot use any control-plane to reach d,
which creates a blackhole pi(x, d) = (x).
If coexisting control-planes comply with Condition i) or ii),
then blackholes cannot occur. If Condition i) is satisfied, then a
non-preemptive FU control-planeM exists. By Property 1 and
the assumption of correctness in isolation, ribM (r, d) 6= ∅ for
any router r and destination d, irrespectively of the presence
of other control-planes. Thus, any router can always rely on
M to populate its FIB to any destination, which guarantees
the absence of blackholes.
Otherwise, if Condition i) does not hold but Condition ii)
does, we have two cases: either all control-planes are preemp-
tive FU, or they are all non-preemptive FA.
In the former case, for every destination d, every node
r must prefer one preemptive FU control-plane Mr. Mr
provides r with a route to d by Property 3, hence r usesMr. In
other words, each node has a FIB entry for every destination,
which guarantees the absence of blackholes.
In the latter case, all control-planes are non-preemptive FA.
Assume by contradiction that a blackhole exists for router r
and destination d. Since all control-planes are non-preemptive,
it must be ribM (r, d) = ∅ for every control-plane M . By
Property 2, this implies ribM (r
′, d) = ∅ for every control-
plane M and every neighbor r′ of r. By iterating the same
argument, we eventually conclude that for every router, every
control-plane does not provide any route for d. This must also
hold for the routers directly connected to d, which contradicts
the assumption of correctness in isolation.
We now characterize the control-plane combinations which
are prone to forwarding loops. To this end, we leverage the
following lemma.
Lemma 1: For any router r and destination d, if used(r, d)
is an FA control-plane M , ∀vi ∈ pi(r, d) such that vi is not
directly connected to d, used(vi, d) = M .
Proof: Let pi(r, d) = (r x)P . If x is directly connected
to d, then P is empty, and the statement directly follows.
Otherwise, x must use M by Property 2. Thus, we can repeat
the same argument to pi(x, d). The statement follows by noting
that we eventually reach a router directly connected to d.
Lemma 1 helps us prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2: A combination of routing control-planes is
guaranteed to be free of forwarding loops if and only if it
includes at most one FU control-plane.
Proof: We prove the statement in two steps.
If at least two least FU control-planes coexist, then forwarding
loops can occur. Consider the example in Fig. 3(b), with d be-
ing a destination. Let used(r, d) = M1 and used(s, d) = M2,
with M2 6= M1, as highlighted in the figure by the different
fillings of r and s. The route towards d that M1 (M2, resp.)
provides to r (s, resp.) in the absence of other control-planes
is via s (r, resp.). By Property 1, those routes are in the
respective RIBs of r and s independently of the presence
of other coexisting control-planes. Because of control-plane
preferences, they are also used to fill the FIB of r and s which
creates a forwarding loop pi(s, d) = (s r s).
If at most one FU control-plane coexist with any number
of FA ones, then forwarding loops cannot occur. Consider
any router r and any destination d. We have three cases. If
used(r, d) = ∅, then there is a blackhole pi(r, d) = (r), hence
no forwarding loop can involve r. Otherwise, if used(r, d)
is an FA control-plane M , then Lemma 1 ensures that all
the routers in pi(r, d) use M , and the absence of forwarding
loops follows by the correctness in isolation of M . Finally, if
used(r, d) is an FU control-plane M ′, then let ribM ′(r, d) =
PQ, with P including only routers (at least r) using M ′,
and Q the (possibly empty) remaining path. The absence
of forwarding loops in P is ensured by the combination of
Property 1 and the correctness in isolation of M ′. Hence,
if Q is empty, the statement directly follows. Otherwise, the
P
P
P
P
PP
M1
M2 p, FA p, FU n, FA n, FU
p, FA B B B -
p, FU B L B L
n, FA B B - -
n, FU - L - L
LEGEND: B=blackholes, L=forwarding loops
TABLE II
CHARACTERIZATION OF FORWARDING ANOMALIES FOR TWO COEXISTING
CONTROL-PLANES. THEOREMS 1 AND 2 GENERALIZE THESE RESULTS TO
AN ARBITRARY NUMBER OF CONTROL-PLANES.
forwarding loop must be found in Q. Let x be the first router
in Q. Since, by hypothesis, M ′ is the only FU control-plane,
used(x, d) is an FA control-plane. We can then apply one of
the two previous arguments to x, proving the statement.
Together, Theorems 1 and 2 characterize the kinds of
forwarding anomalies that can occur for any combination
of an arbitrary number of coexisting control-planes. As an
example, Table II shows the anomaly characterization deriving
from those theorems in the case of two coexisting control-
planes. In the table, p and n respectively stand for preemptive
and non-preemptive. Interestingly, blackholes and forwarding
loops never happen at the same time. Also, blackholes can
exist only in the presence of a preemptive control-plane (e.g.,
OpenFlow), and that forwarding correctness is guaranteed for
combinations of FU and FA IGPs (which are non-preemptive
by definition). We further discuss the implications of our
theoretical findings on (hybrid) SDN networks in Sec. VI.
B. Sufficient Conditions for Anomaly-Prone Combinations
We now propose sufficient conditions to guarantee forward-
ing correctness of control-plane combinations which do not
comply with Theorems 1 and 2. We refer to those combina-
tions as blackhole-prone and loop-prone respectively.
First, we introduce a sufficient condition to prevent black-
holes in blackhole-prone control-plane combinations. To this
end, we need to introduce a few extra concepts. Given a
network graph G, a control-plane M and a destination d, we
denote the set of connected components of G containing only
routers preferring M for d as Γ(G,M, d). Also, we say that a
connected component C is attached to a destination d if any
router r ∈ C or a neighbor of r is directly connected to d.
Lemma 2: Let r be a router, r′ be a neighbor of r, and d
a destination directly connected to r. Then, used(r′, d) = M ,
with M being the most preferred control-plane of r′ for d.
Proof: Since d is directly connected to r, r uses all
the coexisting control-planes for d. In particular, it uses M ,
and makes the route (r′ r d) available to r′ in M . Hence,
ribM (r
′, d) 6= ∅. Since M is the most preferred control-plane
by r′ for d by hypothesis, r′ uses M to populate its FIB,
yielding the statement.
Intuitively, we can use Lemma 2 to prove that, in a con-
nected component C ∈ Γ(G,M, d) attached to destination d,
at least one router is guaranteed to use control-plane M . This
enables us to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3: If for every destination d, each router belongs
to a connected component C ∈ Γ(G,M, d) for some control-
planeM , such that C is attached to d, blackholes cannot occur.
Proof: Let d be a destination, and C ∈ Γ(G,M, d) be
a connected component attached to d, for some control-plane
M . We now show that all the routers in C use M .
If M is FU, it directly follows by noting that all routers in
C prefer M (by definition of C) and ∀r ∈ C ribM (r, d) 6= ∅
(because of Property 1, possibly combined with Property 3 for
preemptive control-planes). Otherwise, if M is FA, let r be
any router in C. By definition of C, a path (v0, . . . , vk), with
k ≥ 0, must exist such that v0 = r, ∀i = 0, . . . , k vi ∈ C,
and vk is either directly connected to d or is a neighbor of a
router (possibly not in C) directly connected to d. All routers
vi prefer M , by definition of C. Moreover, Lemma 2 implies
used(vk, d) = M . By Property 2, we derive ribM (vk−1, d) 6=
∅, hence used(vk−1, d) = M because M is the most preferred
control-planes at vk−1. By iterating the same argument on all
vi routers, we eventually conclude ∀r ∈ C used(r, d) = M .
Since every router r ∈ C usesM , then fib(r, d) 6= ∅, which
prevents blackholes inside C. The statement then follows
by noting that, by hypothesis, for every router r and every
destination d, r belongs to some C ∈ Γ(G,M, d) for some
control-plane M , with C attached to d.
We now deal with forwarding loops. To this end, we define
the preferred FU graph to a destination d as the graph obtained
by merging the RIB entries of the most preferred FU control-
plane of every router in the network. More formally, given a
destination d, the preferred FU graph to d contains all and only
the edges corresponding to ribM∗(r, d), where r is a router and
M∗ is the most preferred among the FU control-planes at r.
Observe that M∗ is not necessarily the most preferred control-
plane at r, hence the preferred FU graph do not coincide in
general with the graph we would obtain by simply merging
all the FIB entries.
Theorem 4: If for every destination d the preferred FU graph
is acyclic, then no forwarding loop can occur.
Proof: Assume by contradiction that a forwarding loop L
exists for a destination d. Let r be a router in L, i.e., pi(r, d) =
(l0 l1 . . . lk l0) with k ≥ 1 and l0 = r. Let M = used(r, d).
If M is FA, pi(r, d) contains only routers that use M , by
Lemma 1. Hence, L contradicts the assumption of correctness
in isolation of M . Thus, M must be FU. To be used, M must
actually be the most preferred FU control-plane at r.
By iterating the same argument on all routers in L, we
conclude that every li ∈ L use the most preferred FU control-
plane at li. Hence, the existence of L contradicts the hypothesis
that the preferred FU graph is acyclic.
V. EXTENSIONS AND APPLICATIONS
In this section, we apply the theoretical insights developed
in Sec. IV to devise configuration guidelines (Sec. V-A) and
a generic network reconfiguration strategy (Sec. V-B).
A. Configuration Correctness
Sec. IV provides sufficient conditions to guarantee the
absence of forwarding anomalies. We leverage them to propose
Guidelines to avoid blackholes
A1: Do not use preemptive control-planes.
A2: Run at least one non-preemptive FU control-plane.
A3: For any destination d and control-plane M , configure at
least one neighbor of a router directly connected to d to prefer
M over any other control-plane.
Fig. 4. Compliance with any of these guidelines ensures no blackholes.
Guidelines to avoid forwarding loops
B1: Run at most one FU control-plane.
B2: Configure FU control-planes so that, for any destination,
their combined routes do not contain loops.
Fig. 5. Compliance with any of these guidelines ensures no forwarding loops.
the configuration guidelines in Fig. 4 and 5. A network which
is compliant with any of Guidelines A1, A2 or A3 is provably
free from blackholes by Theorems 1 (for A1 and A2) and 3
(for A3). Similarly, compliance with either Guideline B1 or
B2 ensures the absence of forwarding loops, by Theorems 2
and 4 respectively.
Guidelines A1, A2, and B1 only limit the classes (according
to our taxonomy) of coexisting control-planes, without con-
straining the relative preference between control-planes or the
installed forwarding paths. For these reasons, the guarantees
that they provide are robust to network failures. Unfortunately,
they are not universally applicable. For example, a network
operator may specifically need to run multiple FU control-
planes (violating B1) or could not run a non-preemptive FU
control-plane, e.g., because it is not supported by all routers in
her network (violating A2). In these cases, Guidelines A3 and
B2 can be followed to guarantee correct forwarding at the cost
of restricting control-plane preferences based on the network
topology (A3) or constraining the forwarding paths computed
by FU control-planes (B2). Guidelines A3 and B2 are not
robust to failures. However, they can be used to perform what-
if analyses about the correctness robustness, e.g., by simulating
a number of failures and verifying that they do not affect
compliance with the guidelines.
B. Graceful Reconfigurations
We now leverage the theoretical insights described in
Sec. IV to study safe reconfigurations from any combination
of coexisting control-planes to any other.
Live reconfigurations are crucial to adapt to network dynam-
ics, ensure high performance under changing traffic conditions,
and improve network flexibility and evolvability [4], [17]. A
commonly-used reconfiguration framework, called “Ships in
the Night” (SITN) [6], [18], [5], [4], is based on running
multiple independent control-planes on the same network. For
the sake of simplicity, we now assume the network to run a
single control-plane before (and after) the reconfiguration. To
change the routing configuration of a network, SITN performs
three logical steps: (i) introduces the final control-plane (final
1: compute operational order(G,Minit,Mfin,D)
2: seq ← None
3: if the combination of Mi and Mf is blackhole-prone then
4: Mtmp ← FU control-plane
5: seq ← compute operational order(G,Minit,Mtmp,D) +
compute operational order(G,Mtmp,Mfin,D)
6: else if the combination of Mi and Mf is loop-prone then
7: seq ← compute loopfree order(G,Minit,Mfin,D)
8: else
9: seq ← get any order(G)
10: end if
11: return seq
Fig. 6. A generic forwarding-correct procedure for reconfigurations from any
control-plane to any other.
protocol with its final configuration) as the least preferred
control-plane on all routers; (ii) iteratively changes control-
plane preference on a per-router basis, so that the final control-
plane gradually becomes the most preferred network-wide; and
(iii) removes the (no longer used) initial control-plane. As it
proceeds with changing the control-plane preference at each
router, SITN produces a series of intermediate configurations.
Even if the initial and final state are correct, non-transient
anomalies can occur in intermediate configurations [4], de-
pending on the applied sequence of operations.
Our theory enables both prediction and prevention of
anomalies that can occur during any SITN-based reconfigura-
tion. Indeed, our theoretical results apply to every intermediate
configuration generated in the reconfiguration process.
In particular, Theorems 1 and 2, we are able to predict
possible reconfiguration anomalies, based on just the generic
properties of the initial and final control-planes. For example,
Table II shows that forwarding loops can occur if and only
if both the initial and final control-planes are FU, as in the
replacement of one OSPF configuration with another, or in a
migration from IS-IS to OpenFlow.
For reconfigurations in which connectivity can be disrupted,
we devise a generic procedure to preserve forwarding correct-
ness throughout the reconfiguration. Our procedure, summa-
rized in Fig. 6, is based on a static analysis of the control-
planes involved in the reconfiguration. Again, we assume for
simplicity that a single control-plane is configured before and
after the reconfiguration, but the procedure is easy to extend
to the general case of any control-plane combination.
Basically, we distinguish three cases.
Case 1) If the coexistence of the initial control-plane Minit
and the final one Mfin is blackhole-prone, we split the
reconfiguration in two macro-steps (lines 3-5). In the first step,
Minit is replaced by a temporary FU control-plane Mtmp. In
the second step, Mtmp is replaced by Mfin. To perform each
step, the procedure is called recursively. The presence ofMtmp
ensures that the coexisting control-planes in each step are not
blackhole-prone (see Theorem 1), and that the recursive call
falls in another case.
Case 2) If both Minit and Mfin are FU, we compute an
operational sequence that avoids loops (lines 6-7). Such a
sequence has been proved to always exist [4] if we proceed on
a per-destination basis. Multiple destinations can be reconfig-
ured together to speed up the process, as long as the resulting
operational sequence complies with Theorem 4.
Case 3) If the coexistence of Minit and Mfin is guaranteed to
be forwarding correct (i.e., according to Theorems 1 and 2),
we apply an arbitrary operational order (line 9).
To illustrate how this procedure works in practice, we now
discuss a few concrete examples.
Migrating a network from RIP to OSPF, or from EIGRP to
OSPF [6], falls in the third case of our procedure, hence any
operational order can be applied without incurring forwarding
disruptions. Experienced practicioners may have witnessed
such migrations, with the former being motivated by the
scalability limitations of RIP, and the latter by the preference
of industry-standard protocols over proprietary ones. Those
migrations have been typically carried out using SITN [6], [18]
with no service disruptions. This has been perhaps a matter
of luck: if RIP or EIGRP were implemented as FU, the same
migration strategy would have failed to preserve connectivity.
Other reconfigurations require more care to avoid forward-
ing anomalies. For instance, migrating from OSPF to IS-
IS [4] or changing link weights in OSPF [19] are loop-prone
reconfigurations (see Table II) that we can carry out with
our procedure. In this case, however, we need to compute an
operational order that avoids forwarding loops (e.g., reusing
algorithms in [4]). Note that the same procedure can be used
to safely modify FIB entries in OpenFlow networks [17], or
to replace OSPF with OpenFlow network-wide.
Finally, a reconfiguration from EIGRP to OpenFlow, e.g.,
to transition to SDN or to deploy a hybrid SDN network, falls
in the first case of our procedure. Hence, we split it in two
steps. First, we can migrate the network from EIGRP to OSPF,
which is provably anomaly-free. Then, we can replace OSPF
with OpenFlow as explained above.
VI. LESSONS LEARNED
We now discuss broader implications of our theoretical
findings. We organize them as a set of lessons learned on
(i) protocol design, with a special focus on the timely problem
of SDN incremental deployability (Sec. VI-A), (ii) network
design and protocol selection (Sec. VI-B), and (iii) protocol
standardization (Sec. VI-C).
A. Design Protocols with Coexistence in Mind
Our results build a theoretical framework for protocol de-
signers to understand the impact of design choices in networks
with multiple control-planes. This is especially important for
incremental deployability of new protocols and architectures,
recently emerging as a major research problem [20].
As an example of the usefulness of our framework, we
analyze coexistence properties of OpenFlow. OpenFlow is
largely considered the principal SDN protocol. When de-
ployed in isolation, OpenFlow has several advantages, in-
cluding simplicity (e.g., of controller-device interactions that
are based on a programmatic interface to devices’ FIBs),
expressiveness (e.g., ability to match arbitrary packet fields),
and moderate hardware requirements (which may lead to the
reduction of equipment cost in the long-term). Nevertheless,
a straightforward deployment of OpenFlow in hybrid routers
can jeopardize the coexistence with other protocols.
Namely, OpenFlow is FU and preemptive. Sec. IV high-
lights that both blackholes and forwarding loops can occur in
the presence of coexisting control-planes. This is a challenge
for operators that plan for the coexistence of OpenFlow
and other protocols in the short or medium term, e.g., to
support services based on traditional protocols (like MPLS
VPNs) [10]. Even worse, the potential for forwarding anoma-
lies can act as disincentive for operators to start the transition
to SDN. In comparison, other non-preemptive protocols like
I2RS [11] have the advantage of being provably blackhole-
free. Note that a non-preemptive variant of OpenFlow in-
stalling entries in the RIB rather than in the FIB, would
provide the same advantage. Similarly, a recent OpenFlow
specification outlines an FA variant of the protocol, which
mandates routers to produce flow removal messages when a
coexisting control-plane removes a FIB entry (see Section 5.5
of [1]). This would prevent forwarding loops whenever at most
one FU control-plane is used (see Theorem 2).
As an additional example of application of our framework,
consider the case in which an operator is willing to en-
able multi-path (i.e., ECMP) across multiple protocols. For
example, he may be tempted to enrich OSPF routes with
OpenFlow forwarding paths (e.g., surgically violating IGP
shortest paths). Thanks to the generality of our model, we can
re-apply our theory entirely. For instance, forwarding loops are
not prevented in the previous example (assuming OpenFlow
to be FU), but our Guideline B2 can be used to avoid them
by ECMP configuration.
B. Design Networks with Coexistence in Mind
Choosing a routing protocol (or a combination of them) is
non-trivial for an operator: many factors need to be weighed,
including cost, expertise, and protocol-specific features. Our
results show that coexistence properties also need to be
considered at network design time. For instance, one protocol
could be preferred to another based on the ease of gracefully
reconfiguring it or (partially) replacing it (see Sec. V-B).
We stress that network operators should not pick a routing
protocol based solely on the properties described in Sec. III.
For example, Table II should not be misread as suggesting the
deployment of non-preemptive FA protocols. Pros and cons
of each protocol should be, indeed, carefully evaluated. For
example, one downside of FA protocols is that, by definition
(see Property 2), they do not guarantee network-wide dissem-
ination of routes, if not deployed in isolation. This makes
management and troubleshooting much harder in a multi
control-plane setting. More in general, our findings suggest
that coexisting control-planes impose a fundamental trade-off
between correctness guarantees and ease of operation.
C. Define Inputs and Outputs Unambiguously
As discussed in Section IV, the coexistence properties of a
control-plane are determined by its inputs and outputs. This
suggests a simple yet fundamental recommendation to protocol
designers: The inputs and outputs of a routing protocol should
be defined unambiguously. In other words, the choice of inputs
and outputs should never be left to the implementor.
Unfortunately, this has not always been the case in the past.
As an example of vaguely defined inputs, consider the RFC
standardizing RIP [21]. When a RIP router needs to send a
message to another router it reads routes from its routing table.
Quoting [21], ”This table has one entry for every destination
that is reachable throughout the system operating RIP.” Hence,
it is totally unclear whether routes should be fetched from
the RIP RIB, from the FIB, or from any other intermediate
data structure. As a result, different RIP implementations show
heterogeneous interpretations of the standard: RIP is FA in
Cisco IOS and in Juniper JunOS, while it is FU in the
Quagga routing daemon [22]. We experimentally verified this
inconsistency in our testbed (see Fig. 2) with IOS version 12.4,
JunOS version 10.1, and Quagga version 0.99.10.
Observe that inconsistent implementations of the same
protocol are dangerous because they behave differently in a
network that employs multiple control-planes. For example, an
operator using best practices [6] to replace RIP with OSPF in
a Quagga-based network could experience forwarding loops.
Even worse, these anomalies can only be exposed in net-
works with coexisting control-planes. Within a single control-
plane, heterogeneous interpretations are perfectly interopera-
ble, which makes those kinds of inconsistencies unlikely to be
caught by any interoperability test suite.
VII. REVISITING RELATED WORK
Our results generalize and extend previous research contri-
butions in different areas. We now revisit the state of the art
in each of those areas in the light of our contributions.
Safe coexistence of IGP instances. Prior work [12] consid-
ered the independent coexistence of multiple link-state IGP
instances, with the goal of providing configuration setting
that avoid anomalies. Our results extend the ones in [12] in
that: (i) we consider arbitrary combinations of control-planes,
instead of restricting to link-state IGP ones; (ii) Theorem 4
generalizes Guideline 1 in [12]; and (iii) we do not assume
that routers preference is consistent, which for example allows
us to reason about reconfiguration scenarios. Also, our work
can be used to guide routing protocol selection (see Sec. VI-B),
instead of assuming that link-state IGPs must be used.
The problem of guaranteeing stable routing in the presence
of route redistribution between control-planes (e.g., [2], [23],
[24]) is orthogonal to our work, which is targeted to the case
of non-interacting control-planes. Nevertheless, all our results
remain valid whenever routing is stable, e.g., with provably
safe route redistribution configurations [24].
Hybrid SDN. Recent research contributions have proposed
hybrid SDN networks, where an SDN control-plane coexists
with distributed ones. In particular, [7] studies how to improve
traffic engineering by dynamically programming OpenFlow-
only devices without modifying link-state IGP routers. By
Property 3, we can model this scenario by simply imposing
that OpenFlow-only (IGP-only, resp.) routers always prefer the
OpenFlow (IGP, resp.) control-plane. Theorem 2 proves that
this combination is prone to forwarding loops. The techniques
described in [7] avoid them by complying with Guideline B2.
However, as noted in Sec. V, this guideline is not inherently
robust to topology changes, implying that special care is
needed to guarantee correctness under network failures if [7]
is applied. Conversely, using non-SDN routers only to build
forwarding paths between SDN-enabled devices, like in [8],
[25], is a more robust approach, which however does not
exploit non-SDN router capabilities (using them as switches).
Graceful Reconfigurations. Recent IGP reconfiguration tech-
niques (e.g., [4]) leverage coexisting control-planes to progres-
sively shift from an initial to a final configuration. Sec. V
generalizes those techniques by proposing a provably-safe
procedure to reconfigure any combination of control-planes
to any other. As such, our procedure supports many use cases
(including protocol replacement and traffic engineering) across
a wide variety of scenarios, ranging from pure IGP networks
to pure SDN and hybrid SDN deployments. For example,
configuration changes within the same protocol can be safely
performed by simply running different protocol instances in
two control-planes. This also applies to pure SDN networks,
with the initial and final configurations that can be modeled as
different control-planes. Note that, contrary to reconfiguration
techniques based on packet tagging (e.g., [17]), our approach
never duplicates FIB entries on SDN devices. Given the cost
of the TCAM memories used to implement FIB tables (e.g.,
to support OpenFlow’s arbitrary bitmask matching), avoiding
such duplications ensures scalability and may be even needed
in some reconfiguration scenarios.
Multiple control-planes also enable route redistribution re-
configurations [26]. Route redistribution is out of the scope of
this work. However, note that the reconfiguration procedure
presented in Sec. V allows for a generalization of the algo-
rithms described in [26] to networks running protocols other
than link-state IGPs.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Deploying multiple control-planes in a single network is
profitable to improve configuration flexibility, traffic engineer-
ing, and robustness to failures and implementation bugs.
In this paper, we provide a characterization of the anomalies
due to the presence of multiple non-interacting control-planes.
Our characterization is based on fundamental properties of
control-planes that are generic enough to apply to (i) any num-
ber of coexisting control-planes, and (ii) all existing and pos-
sibly future control-planes (both distributed and centralized).
By exploiting our theoretical insights, we propose sufficient
conditions and configuration guidelines that guarantee the
absence of anomalies, and devise a generalized procedure to
perform arbitrary routing reconfigurations without interrupting
connectivity. Finally, we show the wide applicability of our
findings by discussing their impact on (i) the design and
standardization of routing protocols, (ii) the implementation
and incremental deployment of new paradigms like SDN,
and (iii) the trade-offs that operators need to consider when
comparing routing protocols.
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